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Abstract
Frequently, new technologies arise under two or more alternative de-
signs. Moreover, the state of each design evolves over time as a result of
various cumulative improvements. In this paper, we study the strate-
gic interaction between “incumbent” firms (those who already own a
design) and “entrants” (those who do not but would like to adopt the
new technology). We focus on two important decisions by an entrant:
when to choose a design and which design to choose. We show that, in
equilibrium, an entrant chooses the leading design and does not wait.
While the former decision is efficient, the latter is generally not: the in-
cumbent firms’ inability to commit to future prices leads to inefficiently
early technology adoption.
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1 Introduction
Frequently, new technologies arise under two or more alternative versions.
Moreover, the state of each technology version evolves over time as a result
of various cumulative improvements. For example, in the early stages of the
VCR industry there were as many as thirty firms experimenting with various
recording and playing formats.1 Ultimately, two of these reached the market,
those developed by Sony and JVC. Over the years Sony’s Betamax and JVC’s
VHS gradually improved in quality, namely in terms of playing time, one of
the more important quality features. Sony’s Betamax improved from 1 hour
playing time in 1975 to 5 hours in 1982, whereas JVC’s VHS improved from 2
hours in 1976 to 8 hours in 1982.
When presented with multiple competing and evolving technology designs,
firms face a number of important strategic decisions. The owners of each
technology design would potentially like to attract as many firms as possible,
thus increasing royalties and other benefits. In turn, for a firm that does not
own a design the crucial decision is which design to adopt, and when to do
so. To continue with the VCR example, shortly after JVC’s introduction of
the VHS format in September 1976, all major manufacturers in the Japanese
market aligned with one of the two formats. By 1977, Sony’s group included
Toshiba and Sanyo, while JVC, by the end of 1976, had signed up Matsushita,
Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Sharp.
In this paper, we study the strategic interaction between “incumbent” firms
(those who already own a design and are willing to sell it) and “entrants” (those
who do not but would like to adopt the new technology in one of the available
formats). We assume that each technology design evolves stochastically over
time, and that in each period the incumbent firms offer a potential entrant
licensing terms. The entrant must decide when and which licensing terms to
accept.
In our base case, we assume that there are two symmetric incumbents, i.e.,
two firms with identical but independent stochastic processes of technology
evolution; and one potential entrant who (a) does not influence the advance
of the design it licenses and (b) does not compete in the product market
with the incumbents. We show that, in equilibrium, the entrant chooses the
leading technology design. The intuition is that, as in Bertrand competition
with vertical differentiation, the firm with a better product makes the sale.
Moreover, the solution is socially efficient: a welfare maximizing planner would
1The following discussion of the VCR industry draws extensively on Cusumano, My-
lonadis and Rosenbloom (1992), Grindley (1995), and Rohlfs (2001).
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also pick the leading technology design.
Our second result is more surprising: we show that the entrant licenses one
of the technology designs as soon as it is faced with the choice. Specifically,
the entrant does not wait even if both designs are at their earliest levels of
development. The idea is that any potential benefits from waiting and ob-
serving which technology design evolves faster are taken away in the form of
higher licensing fees. Moreover, if players are patient enough then the solution
is socially inefficient: a welfare maximizing planner would prefer the entrant
to wait and then choose the leading technology design. Key to this result is
our assumption that incumbents cannot offer contracts contingent on future
technology improvements. In fact, if such contracts were available then the
equilibrium solution would be socially efficient.
We consider several extensions of our basic framework. First, we gener-
alize the model to the case when there are more than two incumbents. This
extension is non-trivial. In fact, we show there are cases when the entrant
waits (as social efficiency would dictate). The reason is that there is a chance
that two incumbent designs will improve beyond their current level and then
compete with each other, in which case there is an option value in waiting. In
other words, whereas in static models there is a crucial difference between one
and two sellers, in our context the crucial difference is between two and three
or more. Although three or more incumbents may imply equilibrium wait-
ing, we show that the social optimum (weakly) implies longer waiting than in
equilibrium (as in the case of two incumbents).
Our second extension is to consider an entrant who contributes to the de-
velopment of the technology design it adopts.2 Specifically, we consider the
extreme case of an entrant who, like a pure research lab, does not directly ben-
efit from the technology design it adopts but contributes to its development.
We show that, in equilibrium, such a “research” entrant chooses the lagging
technology design, the opposite of a pure “production” entrant, the case we
initially considered. It is still true that an entrant will never wait, though in
the “research entrant” extreme waiting would be socially inefficient.
Other extensions we consider include the possibility of the entrant having
an idiosyncratic preference for one of the technology designs, asymmetric tech-
nology evolution functions, network effects, product market competition, and
multiple entrants.
Our paper is by no means the first to address strategic issues in the adop-
tion of new technology. Important references include Reinganum (1981), Fu-
2Matsushita, for instance, contributed significantly to the development of the VHS for-
mat: it was the first firm to develop a 4 hour and a 6 hour tape.
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denberg and Tirole (1985), Riordan (1992). One common feature of this lit-
erature is competition between potential adopters. Two effects are typically
present: preemption incentives, which lead to early adoption, and informa-
tion spillovers, which lead to late adoption. Equilibrium is typically shown
to feature diffusion, with one firm adopting early, the other one late.3 One
important distinctive feature of our paper is that we consider strategic inter-
action on the supply side, whereas the above papers take supply conditions as
given and focus on the adopter’s decision, possibly in competition with a rival
adopter.
Lee (2003) is closest to our work. Like us, he considers two sellers and a
buyer who can decide when to buy. The buyer’s valuations for each seller are
uncertain and negatively correlated. By waiting, the buyer can obtain more
information about the true state. However, Lee (2003) shows that, if sellers
compete in prices, then the buyer decides to purchase the better product im-
mediately. The intuition is that differentiation increases sellers’ profits because
it decreases the externality of competition. Therefore, a buyer prefers not to
wait, since time increases differentiation.4
Our information framework is different from Lee (2003): we consider two
stochastically independent competing technologies. Our Proposition 2, like
Lee’s (2003) central result, indicates there is no waiting in equilibrium; but
for a different reason. In fact, in our model immediate adoption takes place
even when waiting would lead to lower differentiation. The reason for our no-
wait result is that any potential gains from waiting would be taken away by
higher fees. To stress the importance of this effect, we consider the extension
to three competing sellers and show that waiting may occur in equilibrium.
In fact, with more than two competing sellers, there are events (simultaneous
technology improvement by two lagging technologies) under which the buyer
3There is also a literature on non-strategic aspects of optimal adoption on a new tech-
nology, including the seminal work by Jensen (1982). See Reinganum (1989) for an early
survey of the literature and Hoppe (2002) for a more recent one. See also the survey by
Geroski (2000), which emphasizes new technology diffusion.
4Mason and Weeds (2004) consider the problem of two competing buyers. Like Lee
(2003), they assume the bidders’ valuations are negatively correlated. They show that, in
equilibrium, each agent waits until the state is sufficiently favorable to him; specifically,
each agent waits for longer than in an efficient equilibrium. The intuition is similar to
Lee’s (2003). In Lee (2003), differentiation increases sellers’ profits because it decreases
the externality of competition. Therefore, a buyer prefers not to wait, since time increases
differentiation. In Mason and Weeds (2004), differentiation increases the buyers’ profits (for
the same reason). Therefore, buyers prefer to wait, since time may increase differentiation.
Of related interest is the literature on information provision in auctions. In particular,
Ganuza (2003) shows that a seller has an incentive to release less information to bidders
than would be efficient. The intuition is again the same: ignorance promotes competition.
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is able to capture the increase in benefits.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. We
derive the results regarding the choice of technology design in Section 3, and
the timing of choice in Sections 4 and 3. In Section 6 we introduce a special case
with only two technology levels. The extension to more than two incumbent
firms is derived in Section 7. In Section 9, we consider several other extensions
and potential areas for future research. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Suppose there are two existing technology designs, each owned by a different
firm. A third firm, unable or unwilling to develop its own design, wants to
license one of the existing designs. The game proceeds over an infinite number
of periods. Each period is divided into two stages: a licensing stage and a
research stage. At the licensing stage, if the entrant has not chosen a technol-
ogy design in a previous period, then the two incumbent firms simultaneously
submit license fees. If the entrant decides to join one of the incumbents, then
it pays a license fee, which we assume is a one-time payment. At the research
stage, Nature draws values of technological capability for each of the technol-
ogy designs. These values are drawn from the set {0, 1, ...,m} according to
c.d.f. F (x) (density f). An improvement in technology i takes place if the
value drawn by Nature for that technology is better than the existing one.
The state of the game is given by each technology’s current level as well as
the entrant’s status (adopted technology design x, adopted technology design
y, has not made a decision yet). The initial technology levels are given.
Finally, payoffs are as follows. In each period, a firm that owns or licenses
the technology earns a payoff u(x), a strictly increasing, concave function,
where x is the current state of the particular technology design the firm uses.
Given this specification, we can now derive value functions recursively. Let
S(x) be the value of an incumbent firm excluding license fees. We have
S(x) = u(x) + δ
F (x)S(x) + m∑
x+1
f(t)S(t)

=
u(x)
1− δF (x) +
δ
∑m
x+1 f(t)S(t)
1− δF (x)
Simple calculations show that this is an increasing function:
Lemma 1 S(x) is strictly increasing.
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Table 1: Model Notation.
x current state of technology x; x ∈ {0, ...,m} ;
s state of the game: s = (x, y, ..., z).
S(x) discounted expected value of a technology
when developed by one research unit only;
A(x) discounted expected value of a technology
when developed by two research units (alliance);
F (x) c.d.f. of R&D random draws for a solo research concern;
G(x) c.d.f. of R&D random draws for an R&D alliance;
p(x) license fee offered by incumbent x in state s;
u(x) production payoff from technology at level x;
δ discount factor;
ξ f(1) in the special case when m = 1.
There are two questions of interest: First, which of the two available designs
should the entrant favor; second, when should the entrant make a decision. In
the next two sections, we consider these questions in turn.
3 Choice of technology design
Intuitively, one would expect that it is better to join a leading rather than a
lagging technology design. Given our assumption that both firms draw tech-
nology levels from the same distribution, the expected future payoffs stemming
from the leading technology design are greater. We conclude that
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the entrant chooses the leading technology de-
sign.
Proof: Suppose that the entrant is to make a choice at time t. Incumbents
have nothing to gain from an entrant other then license fees. From the en-
trant’s point of view, the value of choosing a design that is currently at level
x is given by S(x). Since S(.) is increasing (Lemma 1), it follows that the
firm with technology level y > x will attract the entrant by charging a fee
S(y)− S(x). In equilibrium the leader ends up with a value of 2S(y)− S(x),
while both the laggard and the entrant will have a value of S(x).
The thrust of the proof is to note that the game is roughly analogous to
Bertrand competition with zero marginal cost levels and different valuations.
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In equilibrium, it’s the firm with a higher valuation that makes the sale, setting
a price equal to the difference in valuations.
4 Timing of technology adoption
Consider now the second question: when should an entrant join one of the
incumbent technology designs? We find that,
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the entrant joins an incumbent at the earliest
feasible date.
Proof: Suppose that, for all values (x′′, y′′) not in the set S, defined by
x′ ≤ x and y′ ≤ y, waiting is not an equilibrium. Suppose that waiting is an
equilibrium at (x, y), where x ≤ y (without loss of generality). Then, it must
be the case that no incumbent can propose to the entrant a better deal than
waiting.
Let J(x, y) be the joint value that incumbent y and the entrant expect to
get if the entrant decides to wait at (x, y) for one period but joins in the next
period even if the state does not change.5 We then have
J(x, y) = u(y) + δ
F (x)F (y)2S(y) + F (y) (1− F (x)) 2S(y)+
+
m∑
i=y+1
f(i)2S(i)

The three terms after δ on the right hand side of this equation correspond
to the following cases: (a) neither incumbent improves its technology design,
in which case we remain in the same state; (b) the lagging technology design
improves, whereas the leading technology design does not; (c) both technology
designs improve. The payoff in case (a) is justified by our assumption that the
entrant’s strategy is to join in the next period, regardless of the state. Cases
(b) and (c) require some additional explanation. Suppose the new state is
given by (x′′, y′′). Two subcases are possible. If x′′ > max(y, y′′) then the
entrant will form an alliance with incumbent x. However, the entrant pays a
license fee equal to S(x′′)−S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
and will be left with S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
.
Hence, the joint payoff of entrant and incumbent will be 2S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
. If
5By the one-stage-deviation principle (cf Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994) it suffices to con-
sider a one-time deviation from the prescribed equilibrium strategy in order to confirm that
it is indeed an equilibrium strategy.
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x′′ < max(y, y′′), then the entrant will form an alliance with incumbent y and
their joint payoff will be again 2S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
. Consequently, regardless of
which incumbent will be the leader in any future state, the joint payoff of the
entrant and incumbent y will be 2S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
.
By immediately joining incumbent y, the entrant and the incumbent jointly
make 2S(y). Given our definition of S(y) and J(x, y) it follows that:
2S(y)− J(x, y) = u(y) > 0,
which contradicts the equilibrium hypothesis. Now consider state (x − 1, y).
The only states that can be reached from here, in addition to state (x− 1, y)
itself, are (x, y) and states (x′′, y′′) outside of S. The above argument can
be applied, implying no waiting at (x − 1, y). By induction, we conclude
that there is no waiting at any state such that x′ = x or y′ = y. We have
thus gone from an initial set S =
{
(x′, y′) s.t. x′ ≤ x, y′ ≤ y} to a new set
S =
{
(x′, y′) s.t. x′ ≤ x− 1, y′ ≤ y − 1}. Clearly, there is no waiting when S
coincides with the entire set. By induction, we conclude there is no waiting at
any state.
It is worthwhile emphasizing the intuition for this result. If the entrant’s
strategy is to wait for one period and then join regardless of the state, the
joint future payoff of entrant and incumbent y (the current leader) is always
2S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
, regardless of whether incumbent y remains a leader or be-
comes a follower. The reason is that even though incumbent y may become
a follower, in which case the entrant joins the new leader, the entrant’s value
is still equal to S
(
max(y, y′′)
)
since it has to pay the new leader a higher
equilibrium license fee. As a result, in the case of waiting, the joint payoff of
the entrant and incumbent y depends only on incumbent y’s expected technol-
ogy improvement. But so does the joint payoff from adopting in the current
period. Hence, adopting today rather than tomorrow adds the extra payoff
u(y) from production today.
One might expect the entrant to have some value from waiting, at least
in some circumstances. For example, if the two incumbents are still at low
technology levels, by waiting, one might get information about their rate of
success. Moreover, if one firm is ahead of the other, waiting might have the
advantage of bringing the firms together, thus allowing the entrant to play
one against the other. Proposition 2 shows that none of these considerations
applies in the present context. The reason is that all of the entrant’s potential
gains from waiting are taken away by Bertrand competition.
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5 Social welfare
In the previous sections, we looked at the equilibrium solution. How does
this differ from the social optimum? A central planner would choose time and
technology design so as to maximize the incremental welfare brought about by
the entrant. Our main result in this section shows that, starting from state
(x, y), where x < y, a social planner may prefer to wait.
Proposition 3 There exists a u (y; ξ, δ) such that, if u (y) < u (y; ξ, δ), then
it is socially optimal for the entrant to wait when in state (x, y), where x < y.
Proof: Suppose we are currently in state (x, y). Consider the increase in
social welfare brought about by the entrant. If the entrant chooses technology
design y now, then the discounted expected benefit is
S(y) = u(y) + δ
F (y)S(y) + m∑
y+1
f(t)S(t)

If the entrant decides to wait for one period instead, then the payoff is analo-
gous to S(y) with a progress function given by G(y) = F (y)2. The idea is that,
by waiting, the entrant has the option to choose the best technology design in
the next period out of two possible technology designs. Since G(y) first-order
stochastically dominates F (y), and S(y) is strictly increasing (cf Lemma 1), it
follows that, except for current payoff u(y), the expected payoff from waiting
is strictly greater than choosing now (cf Milgrom, 1981).
The intuition is straightforward. Suppose we ignore license fees, as social
optimization prescribes. Suppose moreover that current payoff is zero. Then
waiting is the optimal strategy. Making a choice now would lead, with positive
probability, to regret tomorrow.
6 The m = 1 case
We now consider the special case when m = 1, that is, when the technology
level x can be at one of two possible levels: 0 and 1. We maintain this as-
sumption throughout the remainder of the paper (unless otherwise stated).
Moreover, we let ξ ≡ f(1). This special case is useful in several ways. In
this section, we consider the m = 1 case to better understand the intuition
underlying Proposition 2.
Suppose the current state is (0, 1). Given Bertrand competition between
incumbents, the laggard reduces its license fee down to marginal cost (zero).
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In equilibrium, the entrant is indifferent between joining either of the two
incumbents. This implies that, if the entrant were to choose one of the designs
now, it would receive a payoff equivalent to joining the laggard for free, that
is, S(0). This value is recursively derived as follows:
S(0) = u(0) + δ
(
(1− ξ)S(0) + ξS(1)
)
.
Suppose alternatively that the entrant decides to wait one period (and then
continues the policy of not waiting). Then the entrant’s expected payoff is:
WE(0, 1) = 0 + δ
(
(1− ξ)S(0) + ξS(1)
)
,
which is clearly lower than S(0). Specifically, WE(0, 1) = S(0) − u(0). In
words, by waiting for one period, the entrant forgoes one period of production
profits and gains nothing. Why is this so? There are two possible outcomes
of the current period’s uncertain R&D process: either the lagging technology
design improves or it does not. If the lagging technology design does not
improve, then we are back in the initial situation, and nothing is gained (in
terms of future value) from waiting. If the lagging technology design improves
from 0 to 1, then the entrant earns S(1) from tomorrow on. In fact, there
will be two incumbents with high-level of technology; Bertrand competition
thus implies a zero license fee and the entrant captures the entire value S(1).
But this is exactly what the entrant would have gotten in expectation, had he
not waited. So, in terms of future value, regardless of the outcome of today’s
R&D draw, the entrant is equally well off by adopting now as by waiting for
one period. The only difference is then the current payoff flow u(0) that is
foregone by waiting.
7 Extension: three or more incumbents
Our results in the previous sections depend on a number of simplifying as-
sumptions. In particular, Proposition 2 (no waiting) depends crucially on the
assumption that there are only two incumbent firms, that is, two available
technology designs. To see why, consider the case of three incumbents. Sup-
pose we are currently in state (0, 0, 1) and that the same reasoning applies as
in the two-incumbent case (Section 4). Then, in equilibrium the entrant will
be indifferent between joining either of the three incumbents. This implies
that, if the entrant were to choose one of the technology designs now, it would
receive a payoff equivalent to joining one of the laggards for free, that is, S (0).
The latter is recursively derived as follows:
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S(0) = u(0) + δ
(
(1− ξ)S(0) + ξS(1)
)
.
Suppose alternatively that the entrant decides to wait one period (and then
continues the policy of not waiting). Then the entrant’s expected payoff is
WE(0, 0, 1) = 0 + δ
(
(1− ξ)2S(0) +
(
1− (1− ξ)2
)
S(1)
)
.
While in the two-incumbents case it was clear that S(0) > WE(0, 1), it is now
quite possible that S(0) < WE(0, 0, 1). In fact, for any ξ ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1),
we can find a small enough u(0) such that waiting is optimal.
The intuition is that, with two lagging technology desings, there are out-
comes of today’s R&D process that would lead the entrant to regret having
made an early choice. Specifically, if the entrant joins the leader it receives a
payoff of S(0); whereas by waiting, the entrant could benefit from Bertrand
competition between the leading technology design and either one of the now
co-leading technology designs, yielding a payoff S(1). With two incumbents,
the entrant’s expectation of getting a payoff S(1) from waiting depends only
on the improvement of the lagging technology design. However, the payoff
from joining now, S(0), already incorporates that possibility. With three in-
cumbents, the likelihood of getting S(1) by waiting is increased, since now
there are two firms that can improve their technology designs. The payoff
from joining now, S(0), incorporates only the likelihood of one technology de-
signs improving (which is clearly smaller than the likelihood of one out of two
technology designs improving).
If S(0) < WE(0, 0, 1), then our equilibrium assumption that, at stage
(0, 0, 1), Bertrand competition leads the leader to set a fee S(1) − S(0) is
no longer valid. In fact, the leader’s binding constraint is not competition
from current laggards; rather, it is competition from the entrant’s waiting op-
tion. The equilibrium fee would then be the one that makes the entrant just
indifferent between waiting and not waiting: p(0, 0, 1) = S(1) −WE(0, 0, 1).
This implies that, in equilibrium, and starting from state (0, 0, 1), the entrant
expects a value greater than S(0).
We can now roll back to state (0, 0, 0) to show that there can be waiting
in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose there are three incumbents and that ξ > 12 . There
exists a u (ξ, δ) such that, if u (0) < u (ξ, δ), then in equilibrium and in state
(0, 0, 0) the entrant decides to wait.
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Proof: By moving ahead at state (0, 0, 0), the entrant gets S(0), computed
as above, whereas by waiting it gets
WE(0, 0, 0) = 0 + δ
(
(1− ξ)3VE(0, 0, 0) + 3ξ(1− ξ)2VE(0, 0, 1)+
+ξ2(3− 2 ξ)S(1)
)
.
Since VE(i, j, k) ≥ S(0) and VE(0, 0, 1) > S(0), it follows that
WE(0, 0, 0) > 0 + δ
(
ξ2(1 + ξ)S(0) + ξ2(3− 2 ξ)S(1)
)
.
If u(0) = 0, then both S(0) and WE(0, 0, 0) are convex combinations of
S(0) and S(1). Since S(1) > S(0), it follows that WE(0, 0, 0) > S(0) if
ξ2(3 − 2 ξ) > ξ, which is equivalent to ξ > 12 . We conclude that, if ξ > 12 ,
the expression following δ in WE(0, 0, 0) is greater than the corresponding ex-
pression in S(0). Consequently, one can find a small enough u(0) such that
waiting is the equilibrium outcome.
Note that the conditions in Proposition 4 are sufficient, not necessary. We
finally show that, while there may be waiting in equilibrium, it is still the
case that the social optimum implies (weakly) waiting for longer than the
equilibrium solutions.
Proposition 5 The socially optimal time of adoption is never earlier than
the equilibrium time of adoption.
Proof: Suppose that
S(0) > δ
(
(1− ξ)2S(0) +
(
1− (1− ξ)2
)
S(1)
)
.
If this condition holds, then there is no waiting in state (0, 0, 1) and in equi-
librium V (0, 0, 1) = S(0). It follows that, in equilibrium, there is no waiting
in state (0,0,0) either.
Suppose now that
S(0) < δ
(
(1− ξ)2S(0) +
(
1− (1− ξ)2
)
S(1)
)
.
From the above discussion in the text, this may lead to waiting in equilibrium.
However, since S(1) > S(0), the above inequality implies that
S(0) < δ
(
(1− ξ)3S(0) +
(
1− (1− ξ)3
)
S(1)
)
,
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which in turn implies that it is socially efficient to wait.
Proposition 5 is fairly intuitive. From a private point of view, the event
that justifies waiting is the simultaneous technology improvement by two or
more incumbents. From a social point of view, however, waiting pays off if at
least one incumbent improves its technology design. As a result, equilibrium
waiting is a sufficient condition for efficient waiting.
8 Extension: research alliances
Our second extension is to consider an entrant who contributes to the devel-
opment of the technology design it adopts. For example, Matsushita, one of
the “entrants” in the VCR race, contributed significantly to the development
of the VHS format: it was the first firm to develop a 4 hour and a 6 hour
tape. Specifically, we consider the extreme case of an entrant who, like a pure
research lab, does not directly benefit from the technology design it adopts
but contributes to its development.
We continue to consider the same timing as before. However, we now as-
sume that a technology design adopted by an entrant progresses according
to a distribution G(x) that strictly dominates F (x) in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance, that is, G(x) < F (x) for all x < m. Finally, incumbent
payoffs are as before, u(s) per period, whereas, consistently with our assump-
tion of a “pure research” entrant, the latter receives no “production” payoffs
u(s). In other words, the only payoff received by the entrant is the one-time
payment by the incumbent firm it joins.
Let A(x) be the incumbent’s value, net of transfers to the entrant, given
that it managed to attract the latter. We have
A(x) = u(x) + δ
G(x)S(x) + m∑
x+1
g(t)S(t)

=
u(x)
1− δG(x) +
δ
∑m
x+1 g(t)S(t)
1− δG(x) .
Clearly, if the incumbent does not attract the entrant than its value is given
by S(x) (introduced in Section 2).
As before, there are two questions of interest: which of the two available
designs should the entrant favor; and when should the entrant make a decision.
Before considering these questions we establish a useful result, the proof of
which can be found in the Appendix:
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Lemma 2 A(x)− S(x) is strictly decreasing.
We will now show that, in terms of choice of technology design, the equilib-
rium prediction in the R&D entrant case is the opposite of a pure production
entrant.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, a pure research entrant chooses the lagging
technology.
Proof: Other than monetary transfers, a pure research entrant is indifferent
between incumbents. The opposite is true for an incumbent, who has to gain
from a pure research entrant insofar as a technology alliance speeds up the pro-
cess of technology improvement. The entrant will thus chose the incumbent
offering the most. Since A−S is decreasing (Lemma 2), it follows that the firm
with technology level x < y will attract the entrant by paying A(y) − S(y).
In equilibrium, the laggard ends up with a value of A(x)−
(
A(y)− S(y)
)
, the
leader with S(y) and the entrant with A(y)− S(y).
The thrust of the proof is to note that the game is analogous to a second
price auction with different valuations. In equilibrium, the firm with higher
valuation will make the purchase and pay a price equal to the other firm’s
valuation.
We proceed with the question regarding the timing of choice. Similarly to
a production entrant we find that:
Proposition 7 In equilibrium, a research entrant joins an incumbent at the
earliest possible date, regardless of the number of incumbents.
Proof: The added value that incumbent x and the entrant expect to get if
the entrant decides to wait at (x, y) for one period but joins in the next period
even if the state doesn’t change is given by
J(x, y) = δ
F (x)F (y) (A(x)− S(x))+ F (x) (1− F (y)) (A(x)− S(x))+
+
m∑
i=x+1
f(i)
(
A(x)− S(x)
)
The three terms after δ on the right hand side of this equation correspond
to the same cases as a production entrant. The payoff in case (a) is justified
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by our assumption that the entrant’s strategy is to join in the next period,
regardless of the state. For cases (b) and (c), again, two subcases are possible.
Suppose the new state is given by (x′′, y′′). If x′′ < max(y, y′′), then the entrant
will form an alliance with incumbent x, for an added value of A(x′′)− S(x′′).
If x′′ > max(y, y′′), then the entrant will form an alliance with incumbent y
and receive a payoff of A(x′′) − S(x′′), the added value of the entrant to a
pairing with incumbent x. Consequently, regardless of which incumbent will
be the laggard in any future state, the value added by the research entrant
when pairing with incumbent x will be A
(
min(x, x′′)
)
− S
(
min(x, x′′)
)
.
By immediately joining incumbent x, the added value will simply be A(x)−
S(x). Given our definition of A(x), S(x) and J(x, y) and using Lemma 2 it
follows that(
A(x)− S(x)
)
− J(x, y) ≥ (1− δ)
(
A(x)− S(x)
)
> 0,
which contradicts our equilibrium hypothesis. The argument then continues
as in the case of a production entrant.
9 Other extensions
There are a number of other possible extensions to our framework. For exam-
ple, if the two technology designs are sufficiently differentiated in the eyes of
an entrant, then it is possible for a lagging standard to be chosen by a “pro-
duction” entrant (cf Proposition 1) or a leading standard by a research entrant
(cf Proposition 6). Along similar lines, if u(x) < 0 for some values of x then it
is possible for an entrant to wait in equilibrium. The statement of Proposition
1, “the entrant joins an incumbent at the earliest feasible date,” should then
be read “the entrant joins the leading incumbent as soon as u(x) > 0.”
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the value of a given technology
x depends only on the state of that technology. More generally, we could think
of payoff functions u(s) that are a function of the entire state description, not
just the level of technology x. Consider for example the case m = 1 and
suppose that
u(0, 1) < u(0, 0) < u(1, 1) < u(1, 0),
which is consistent with the two incumbents competing in the product market
or, alternatively, with there being strong network effects leading to a winner-
take-all or winner-take-most “race” between the incumbents. In this setting,
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it is quite possible that Proposition 6 be violated, with a “research” entrant
choosing to sign up with a leading (or winning) incumbent.6
It might be interesting to consider the case when there are n entrants. If
these are “production” entrants, then Proposition 1 goes through: all entrants
prefer to join the leading technology. The same is not true of Proposition 6.
Suppose that an “alliance” of n firms (incumbent and n−1 “research” entrants)
improves its technology design from draws from a distribution Fn(x), where
n is the number of research-oriented alliance members. Then if a sufficiently
large number of firms join the laggard, it is possible that the leader’s marginal
value from attracting the next entrant be greater than the laggard’s. In fact,
starting from a state where incumbents are level, we would expect the entrants
to split between the incumbents.
We have assumed that technology levels are drawn from a well know distri-
bution F (x). Consider the following more general model of R&D uncertainty.
Suppose that incumbent i draws new technology levels from a distribution
Fi(x). Suppose moreover that Fi(x) is randomly drawn from a set of distribu-
tion functions F = {Fi(x)}; incumbents and entrants hold a common prior on
each element of F ; and there is no asymmetric information. It can be shown
that Proposition 2 still holds in this context. The idea is that, although value
functions are more complicated, the fact that there is common knowledge re-
garding the future implies that Bertrand competition washes away any benefit
from waiting.
10 Concluding remarks
The basic problem that we set out to address in this paper—choice among
alternative versions of a new technology—is clearly relevant in many industries.
As we look into specific real-world cases, we see that each case has its own
specificities. Still, we believe that the results we derive can help understand
the main forces at work. In Section 1, we mentioned the case of video cassette
recorders (VCRs). Another interesting case is that of third-generation wireless
telecommunications standards (see Gandal et al., 2003). Although opinions
diverge, one may argue that Qualcomm’s CDMA2000 is ahead of the 3G race
against Nokia’s WCDMA. Partly, this is due to the fact that CDMA2000 is a
relatively simple upgrade with respect to existing CDMA, whereas WCDMA
is a more drastic change. This implies a greater difficulty in bringing WCDMA
to market, a fact that is reflected in the numbers: by the beginning of 2003,
6This is reminiscent of the “efficiency” or “joint profit” effect characterized by Gilbert
and Newbery (1982) and others.
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CDMA had signed up almost 32 million subscribers worldwide, compared to
160 thousand for WCDMA (Gandal et al, 2003). In this context, the results
from Sections 3 and 8 suggest that research intensive firms are more likely to
join the Nokia bandwagon, whereas production intensive firms are more likely
to join the Qualcomm camp.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: We first show that
∆S = S(x + 1)− S(x) = ∆u
1− δF (x) > 0
∆A = A(x + 1)− A(x) = ∆u
1− δG(x) > 0,
where ∆u = u(x + 1)− u(x). In fact,
S(x) = u(x) + δ
F (x)S(x) + m∑
x+1
f(t)S(t) dt

= u(x) + δ
F (x)S(x) + f(x + 1)S(x + 1) m∑
x+2
f(t)S(t) dt

= u(x) + δ
F (x)S(x)− F (x)S(x + 1) + F (x)S(x + 1) +
+ f(x + 1)S(x + 1)
m∑
x+2
f(t)S(t) dt

= u(x) + δ
F (x)S(x)− F (x)S(x + 1) + F (x + 1)S(x + 1) m∑
x+2
f(t)S(t) dt

Moreover,
S(x + 1) = u(x + 1) + δ
F (x + 1)S(x + 1) + m∑
x+2
f(t)S(t) dt

It follows that
∆S(x) ≡ S(x + 1)− S(x) = ∆u(x) + δF (x)∆S(x),
or simply
∆S(x) =
∆u(x)
1− δF (x) .
Similarly, we can show that
∆A(x) ≡ A(x + 1)− A(x) = ∆u(x)
1− δG(x) .
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We therefore conclude that(
A(x + 1)− S(x + 1)
)
−
(
A(x)− S(x)
)
=
= ∆A(x)−∆S(x) = ∆u(x)
1− δG(x) −
∆u(x)
1− δF (x) < 0,
since F (x) > G(x) for all x.
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